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Legislative Proposals to Codify Directors’ Liability for Insolvent Trading in Hong Kong:  
A Ten-Year Journey 
 
Tina Chu * and Angus Young† 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Hong Kong is a modern global city with a reputation for well-regulated financial markets, but for 
years, the government had been trying to enact laws on corporate rescue procedures with 
relatively little success. It is under the pretext of the Global Financial Crisis, the threat of a future 
economic meltdown gave the Hong Kong government the impetus to revisit this issue. This third 
attempt to codify statutory obligations on directors’ liability for insolvent trading has been 
criticised for either setting the standards too high or low for directors trading whilst insolvent. 
There is also some reservation given the beliefs and values of directors in Chinese family-owned 
and controlled companies. These companies would most likely trade out the difficult times. 
Nevertheless, this does not negate from the fact that the enactment of corporate rescue 
procedures in Hong Kong in 2010 is a momentous achievement for the Hong Kong government. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article retraces the rationale and debate on the long awaited reforms to corporate rescue 
procedures in Hong Kong. The recent attempt to reintroduce a Bill to the Hong Kong Legislative 
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Council was based on the Companies Ordinance (CO) (Amendments) Bill 2000 and the 
Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 (CCR Bill).1 One of the controversial proposals was to 
impose personal liability on directors for insolvent trading.2 The two previous failed attempts to 
enact corporate rescue procedure made the Hong Kong government cautious and weary. As a 
strategic response, current proposals amended the original provisions of the CCR Bill 2001. In 
particular, section 295C of the CCR Bill was “watered down” to appease the business 
community. 
 
In October 2009, the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB) released a Consultation 
Paper to seek public submission on the amended provisions of the new proposed legislation 
under the pretext of the Hong Kong government policy initiatives in the aftermath of the Global 
Economic Crisis of 2008-9. In July 2010, the FSTB published a conclusion paper from public 
consultations. From the public submissions, there was considerable support for this legislation 
when the Hong Kong government removed controversial wordings from the previous proposal in 
this recent attempt. 
 
This article will discuss the rationale behind the Hong Kong government’s initiatives to enact 
laws to regulate corporate rescue procedures, retrace some of the debates and provisions of the 
original Bills which failed to be enacted, and examine the most recent set of proposals, in 
particular on the issue of directors’ liability for insolvent trading. Even though this paper is 
                                                 
1 See Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 (Hong Kong) draft section 295C.  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-
01/english/bills/c025-e.pdf viewed 18 June 2010. 
2 See Companies (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 (Hong Kong) draft section 295E.  http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr00-
01/english/bills/c025-e.pdf viewed 18 June 2010. 
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primarily descriptive, the contribution is to review and comment on the various reincarnations of 
the Bills into its current set of proposals, as well offer some insights into corporate law reform in 
Hong Kong. Furthermore, this paper shall delve into the cultural dimensions of Chinese family-
owned and controlled companies and its impact on the directors’ way of thinking on insolvency. 
 
THE IMPETUS FOR CORPORATE RESCUE LAWS 
Hong Kong is a modern cosmopolitan city known to the international business community as one 
of the freest economy of the world. It was also known as one of the “tiger” economies in Asia. 
The territory had experienced rapid economic growth since the 1970s.3  From the humble 
beginning of a small fishing village known to the British as a “barren rock” in the 18th century to 
become a global business city in the 21st century. The engine behind the emergence of this 
“miracle” economy is the innovative adaptability and entrepreneurial spirit of local businessmen 
and women.4 Majority of the businesses are family-owned and controlled companies governed 
under the centralised control of the founder who is usually the head of the family.5 The key to 
their success stems from the ability of these companies to be highly adaptive to a rapidly 
changing business environment,6 and their aggressive tenacity in capitalising business 
opportunities.7 Hence taking on highly risky ventures is norm when it comes to “doing business” 
in Hong Kong.  
 
                                                 
3 Chowhury A and Islam I, The Newly Industrialising Economies of East Asia (Routledge, London, 1993) pp12-17. 
4 Yu T, ‘From a ‘Barren Rock’ to the Financial Hub of East Asia: Hong Kong’s Economic Transformation in the  
Coordinating Perspective’ (2004) 10(3) Asia Pacific Business Review 360. 
5 See Young A, Li G, and Lau A, ‘Corporate Governance in China: The Role of the State and Ideology in Shaping 
Reforms’ (2007) 28(7) The Company Lawyer 204. 
6 Redding G, The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism (DeGruyter, New York, 1990) pp 221-225. 
7 Redding, n6, p277. 
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With the advent of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it revealed the structural weaknesses and 
excesses of the Hong Kong economy. Much of which was about the drawbacks of its highly 
geared business ventures and over inflated asset pricing driven by short-term speculative gains.8 
For example, the corporate collapse of one of Hong Kong’s most reputable investment houses in 
1998 Peregrine Investment Holdings Ltd literally made the financial sector in Hong Kong jitter.9 
When the Indonesian rupiah took a dive as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis so did 
Peregrine’s investments in Indonesia.10 During Peregrine’s liquidation, five of its directors were 
disqualified for failing to exercise the duty of care, skill and diligence. Clearly highly risky 
investments for short-term gains were fatal.11 In hindsight, if the company had a fighting chance 
of being rescued, the best candidates would have been those charged with governing and 
managing the investment bank.12 This was a lesson not to be lightly. 
 
More recently, the GFC in 2008-9 reiterated the fact that Hong Kong being a small open 
economy is susceptible to external economic shocks. The corporate collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers in the US had major ripple effects on Hong Kong’s economic stability, from the daily 
street protests by aggrieved investors who lost their life savings to the significant dive in Hong 
                                                 
8 See Alba P, Bhattacharya A, Claessens S, Ghosh S and Hernandez L, ‘The Role of Macroeconomic and Financial 
Sector Linkages in East Asia’s Crisis’ in Agenor PR, Miller M, Vines D and Weber A (ed.) The Asian Financial 
Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Consequences (Cambridge University Press, UK, 1999) pp 55-56. 
9 Richburg K, ‘Hong Kong Investment Firm Folds’ Wasington Post (Washington), 13 January 1998, A12. 
10 Tang A, Insolvency in China and Hong Kong: A Practitioner’s Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell Asia, Hong Kong, 
2005) 401. 
11 Tang, n10, p416. See, Philip Leigh Tose v The Official Receiver [2002] 3 HKLRD 235, HCAL63/2002; Wong 
Wing Cheon, Peter v The Official Receiver HCAL64/2002. 
12 Tang, n10, p 419. 
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Kong’s share prices, about a 5.4 percent plunge when the news of the collapse was made 
public.13  
 
Economic crises are catalyst for changes. It is under this pretext the Hong Kong government 
plans to introduce legislation on corporate rescue measures. The Review of Corporate Rescue 
Procedure Legislative Proposals Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper) drafted by the Hong 
Kong Financial Services and Treasury Bureau (FSTB) states (at page 2): 14 
As part of the response to the recent global financial crisis, the Government has adopted the 
recommendation made by the Task Force on Economic Challenges in late January 2009 to re-consider the 
introduction of a corporate rescue procedure to facilitate companies with viable long-term business 
prospects, but in short term financial difficulty, to turn around or restructure.  
 
Even though casual factors of corporate failure are complex, there are some commonalities. Over 
the centuries, major corporate collapses have some of the common tell tale signs; they were 
creative accounting, mismanagement, excessive risk and speculation, overzealous business 
expectations, diminishing margins, and adverse political/economic conditions (domestic and 
international). Leaving aside economic and political factors, much of which are directly or 
indirectly linked to bad governance.15 
 
                                                 
13 Lee M, ‘Hong Kong Lehman Brothers Investors Protest’ The China Post (China), 24 August 2009; ‘Lehman 
Collapse Causes Hong Kong Hangover’ (2008),  http://www.chinesestock.org/show.aspx?id=20605&cid=8 viewed 
5 July 2010. 
14 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, Review of Corporate Rescue Procedure Legislative Proposal: 
Consultant Paper (2009) p 2, http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/topical/review_crplp.htm viewed 29 October 2009. 
15 Finch V, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, UK, 2009) 
, p154-60. 
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Since the heart of corporate governance lies with the board of directors,16 they are culpable for 
the bad governance of a company. In business risk cannot be eliminated, it is part and parcel of 
commerce.  Even though risk is a bigger problem for some sectors like the financial sector, 
directors have to monitor them.17 Underscoring this obligation is the directors’ duty to exercise 
care, skill and diligence. If mismanagement led to the collapse of a company, the directors of that 
company failed to exercise this duty. 
 
Unlike insolvency where the interest of creditors is paramount, in corporate rescue directors have 
to strike a balance between shareholders, creditors, and employees. The cooperation and 
compromise amongst the various stakeholders is vital to a successful outcome and the director 
plays a key role in dealing with these stakeholders during this critical period.18 It is also 
important to note that corporate rescue is not about assigning blame. It is about swift decisions 
and actions to save a company at the brink of insolvency. Hence, it is important to ensure 
directors act at the first sign of financial distress. Even thought there is a general duty for 
directors not to trade while insolvent or near the point of insolvency, statutory obligations to 
include a positive duty to prevent insolvent trading makes its mandatory for directors to act and 
put in place preventative measures. The introduction of such statutory obligation will extend the 
idea of corporate rescue procedures as part of a director’s duties (see figure 1 below). This is also 
one of the major reasons why the Hong Kong government is keen on enacting this statutory duty. 
                                                 
16 Du Plessis J, McConvill J and Bagaric M, Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press, Port Melbourne, 2005) p 53. 
17 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices (Oxford University Press, New York, 
2009) pp 329-333. 
18 Harris J, ‘Director Liability for insolvent Trading: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?’ (2009) 23(3) Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 266. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
EXISTING STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS 
At present, a company director in Hong Kong can be held accountable for trading in solvently 
under two statutory obligations: fraudulent trading or disqualification of unfit directors.  
 
Fraudulent Trading 
Section 275 of the Companies Ordinance (CO) confers personal liability for any persons 
(directors) who traded with intent to defraud creditors would be held personally liable.  This 
obligation was based on the laws transplanted from the territory’s former colonial rulers. It was 
  
Corporate Rescue 
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modelled on the UK’s fraudulent trading provisions found in section 213 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (UK).  
 
Under section 275(1) of CO:  
If in the course of the winding up of a company it appears that any business of the company has been 
carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any 
fraudulent purpose, the court, on the application of the Official  Receiver, or the liquidator or any creditor 
or contributory of the  company, may, if it thinks proper so to do, declare that any persons who were 
knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in manner aforesaid shall be personally responsible, 
without any limitation of liability, for all or any of the debts or other liabilities of the company as the court 
may direct. 
Persons liable under section 275 can consist of current or past directors (this includes shadow 
directors and parent company).19 If the court found the directors of a company to have 
contravened this section, they could be liable for the debt incurred when the company was 
trading during insolvency.20 
 
In the prolix case of Aktieselskabet Dansk Skibsfinansiering v Brothers [2000] 1 HKC 511, the 
court averred that until the enactment of corporate rescue laws in Hong Kong, “fraudulent 
trading”21 remains the only mechanism to avail the court to impose personal liable on directors 
for insolvent trading. Even so, the standard of proof remains a cumbersome hurdle for the 
aggrieved to receive justice. Apart from the issue of determining when the point of insolvency 
                                                 
19 Kwan P, Hong Kong Corporate Law (Longman, Hong Kong, 2006) p141. 
20 Kwan, n20, p 144. 
21 Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) (Hong Kong), s275. 
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arises, to prove “defraud” and “fraudulent purpose” there must be actual dishonesty, 
misrepresentation, and personal gains of directors.22  Furthermore, “to defraud” involves a 
subjective intention of dishonesty, which must be satisfied and not mere speculation.23 This 
statute sets to “a high bar” for creditors or liquidators to take legal action against former directors 
of insolvent companies in Hong Kong. 
 
Disqualification of Unfit Directors  
Section 168H of CO is also one of the most common legal actions faced by directors for trading 
while insolvent. This provision stipulates ground for disqualifying unfit directors. It states if;  
[a]t any time [the company] become insolvent whether while he was a director or  
subsequently; and that his conduct as a director of that company, either taken alone or taken together with 
his conduct as a director of any other company or companies, makes him unfit to be concerned in the 
management of a company.24 
                                                                                                                                                                        
In the case of Official Receiver v Ng Ting Ming [2008] HKCU 331, the Court held that the 
managing director, Ng, has breached his duty by allowing the continuation of trade for a whole 
year after a sum of about HKD $9,000,000 debt was accumulated exceeding the company’s 
assets by about HKD $7,800,000. The court held Ng whom signed the audited accounts knew 
about the financial status of the company has allowed it to continue trading and mismanaging the 
company causing its demise. However, the court did not deal with the liabilities incurred by the 
company while trading in solvently.  
                                                 
22 Kwan, n20, pp138-140. 
23 See Re Patrick and Lyon Ltd [1933] Ch. 786 at 790-792 per Maugham J 
24 Companies Ordinance (Cap.32) (Hong Kong), 168H (1) (a) and (b). 
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Even though disqualification of directors prevent these unfit directors from causing financial 
harm to future creditors by disallowing them to manage companies, it is does not provide actual 
relief for past creditors. At the minimum, directors should be responsible for their own risky 
decisions. Hence, the importance of risk management and accountability calls for legal duties to 
be put in place to prevent insolvent trading as a remedy to put a stop to directors from either 
recklessness or failed to act.  
 
In a Hong Kong landmark case, Chingtung Futures Ltd. (In liquidation) v Lai Cheuk Kwan 
Arthur and Others [1992] 2 HKC 637, Lai was the chairman of Chingtung and when the 
company went into liquidation after the 1987 stock market crash. The company had incurred a 
debt from than HKD $83,977,986. The liquidator brought an action on behalf of the company 
claiming that Lai had breached his duty of care by taking on excessive and unreasonable risk. Lai 
was found to have speculated on shares by hedging on the shares positions on Hang Seng 
Index.25 Mr Lai was ordered to pay damages to the company of HKD $83,977,986. The ratio of 
the case was stated by Bokhary J (at 151):  
Where any director or directors so fail to take reasonable care to protect a company as to expose it to a risk 
of insolvency, and the company becomes insolvent as a result and therefore goes into liquidation, then, if 
any creditor of the company suffers loss and is driven to proving in the liquidation for redress, the 
company's claim against the negligent director or directors cannot be defeated, to the ultimate detriment of 
any creditor, by any ratification which such director or directors may be able to procure of their own 
negligent acts or omissions .  
                                                 
25 Chingtung Futures Ltd. (In liquidation) v Lai Cheuk Kwan Arthur and Others [1992] 2 HKC 637 at 111. 
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Even if codification was a re-statement of general law duties, it could help educate directors like 
Mr Lai to act sooner at the first signs of trouble instead of allowing financial problems to fester, 
or thinking that one could trade out of difficult times.  
 
In the UK, the statutory obligations imposed on directors for wrongful trading provision was 
proven to be necessary as general law obligation did not provide incentives for directors to 
prevent trading whilst insolvent. Prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986, legal action 
against directors for trading while insolvent could only be brought under general law on 
fraudulent trading.26 In the case of R. v Grantham27 it was held that for a prosecution of 
fraudulent trading, dishonesty must be present and thus there must be evidence to demonstrate a 
positive intent of the directors to defraud creditors.28 In contrast, litigation under s.214 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986 is less onerous. For example, in the case of Re DKG Contractors Ltd [1990] 
BCC 903, the company director was sue for breach of director’s duty, as there was no reasonable 
prospect of avoiding liquidation. The court held that, “the method of operating the company 
meant that its assets were not preserved for its general creditors at a time when the company was 
of doubtful solvency”. Furthermore, the wrongful trading provision had an effect on directors’ 
behaviour by obliging them to take positive steps to avoid insolvent trading. This is another 
motivation for Hong Kong to follow suit.  
 
                                                 
26 Predecessor Fraudulent Trading  provision to s213 Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) and s275 Companies Ordinance 
(HK) 
27 [1984] Q.B. 675, 
28 S332 Companies Act 1948 (UK)   
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EARLIER ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE DIRECTOR’S LIABILITY TO AVOID 
INSOLVENT TRADING IN HONG KONG 
In 1990 the Attorney General and Chief Justice of Hong Kong referred the issue of reviewing, 
the law and practice relating to insolvency laws of both individuals and bodies corporate to the 
Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong (LRC) on 14th September.29  
 
The LRC report on insolvency and corporate rescue was released in October 1996. It stated that,  
The purpose of an insolvent trading provision would be to encourage responsible persons to face the fact 
that a company was slipping into insolvency at an early date and cause them to address the situation rather 
than to trade on regardless of the consequences. Insolvent trading should raise the awareness of responsible 
persons of their duty to creditors rather than just having regard to the interests of the shareholders. 
Responsible persons who paid attention to their business, and who took appropriate action when faced with 
insolvency, should never face an application in respect of insolvent trading, whereas those who did not 
would be vulnerable.30 
 
As discussed earlier in Official Receiver v Ng Ting Ming [2008] HKCU 331, the respondent was 
an unfit director because he was, ‘unable to handle corporate affairs in any responsible or law-
abiding manner’. 31 In the judgement, the court reiterated the contains of the LRC report in 1996 
stating that,  
[i]t is very important to bear in mind that as the director of a company he has a very important duty to 
strictly comply with the accounting duties imposed on him. It is because without sufficient accounting 
                                                 
29 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, ‘Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading’ (1996)     
http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rrescue-e.pdf ,viewed 10 July 2010.  
30 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, n38, at 19.7.  
31 Official Receiver v Ng Ting Ming [2008] HKCU 331 at 32. 
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records, any directors cannot act responsibly in making decisions whether to continue trading In my view, 
it is likely that it is as a result of the respondent’s failure to keep proper accounts that led to the commission 
of the other misconduct such as insolvent trading. 32  
 
Much of the substance in the LRC 1996 report was based on the experiences of in the UK and 
the statutory provisions in the UK’s Insolvency Act 1986, Australia’s Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) and the US’s Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Code.33 For historical reasons (Hong Kong was a 
former British Colony) as well as continuity, LRC’s recommendations on directors’ liability for 
insolvent trading was based largely on the UK’s section 214, Insolvency Act 1986 on wrongful 
trading and the recommendations of the UK Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency 
Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, June 1982) (generally referred to as “the Cork Report”).    
 
Briefly, section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) is applicable to the responsible director 
when the company has (i) gone into insolvent liquidation; and (ii) at sometime prior to the 
commencement of the winding up, the director had knowledge of the company having no 
reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation unless the director took every step possible 
to minimise the loss suffered by creditors. 34 The UK provision can be distinguished from Hong 
Kong’s policy objectives as it an aggregation of responsibilities when the company is insolvent 
and being wound up. According to Keay, ‘[r]egulating directors through the use of section 214 
                                                 
32 Official Receiver v Ng Ting Ming [2008] HKCU 331 at 28. 
33 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, n 38, at 1.8-1.10. 
34 Insolvent Act 1986 (UK), s 214 (3). 
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was an attempt to stop directors from externalising the cost of their companies’ debts and 
placing all of the risks of further trading on the creditors.’ 35   
 
In comparison to the LRC’s proposed section of 295C to be inserted in CO will make directors 
and senior management36 personally liable for trading during insolvency if he/she:  
(a) knew or ought reasonably to have known the company was insolvent or knew or ought reasonably to 
have known that there was no reasonable prospect that the company could avoid becoming insolvent; or (b) 
there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company was insolvent or there was no reasonable 
prospect that the company could avoid becoming insolvent, And the director failed to take any steps to 
prevent the insolvent trading. 37 
 
The proposed section aims to impose personal liability on directors and senior management who 
allow or failed to take steps to prevent the company from insolvent trading. Furthermore, the 
LRC report recommended that the power to make an application to the court against a director or 
senior manager should be vested in a liquidator. And that directors and senior management 
should be liable to pay compensation if the company traded while insolvent. A defence could be 
mounted if a responsible director and senior manager established that he or she had warned the 
board about insolvent trading and was opposed the course of actions the company had taken.38  
 
                                                 
35 Keay A, “Wrongful trading and the liability of company directors: a theoretical perspective” (2006) 25 Legal 
Studies 3, pp 431-461. 
36 See Hong Kong Legislative Council,  n1,  “reasonable person” in the definition of the proposed Bill 
37 Hong Kong Legislative Council, n1. 
38 The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, n37, at 10.7. 
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In January 2000, a CO (Amendments) Bill was presented to Legislative Council. A new section 
called 295C was to be inserted in CO, but the Bill was removed for consideration because there 
was insufficient time for the Legislative Council to resolve the controversial issues contained in 
the Bill. A second attempted in May 2001, this time the Bill was retitled as the Companies 
Ordinance (Corporate Rescue) Bill 2001 (CCR Bill). The CCR Bill was allowed to lapse in 2004 
as it was not possible to complete the scrutiny of the Bill in the select committee before the end 
of the Legislative Council term.39 The underlying problem was that there were the diverse views 
among stakeholders, particularly on how to deal with employees’ outstanding entitlements, and 
the Bill was allowed to lapse.40  
 
In 2006, Rogers VP commented in his dicta in the case of Re Legend International Resorts Ltd 41 
that it is not the court’s duty to legislate but read existing laws, nevertheless he inferred that law 
reform on corporate rescue and insolvency was long overdue.42 His honour stated that:  
In the Report on Corporate Rescue and Insolvent Trading by the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong 
published in October 1996, recommendation was made for the introduction of a law which would enable 
corporate rescues to take place far more conveniently than at present. Even now, nearly 10 years later, no 
such law has been enacted. It is not appropriate for this court to examine the reasons why no such law has 
been introduced.43 
                                                 
39 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 8. 
40 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 8. 
41 [2006] HKCU 357 
42 His honour also agreed with the views of Yuen J in Re Keview (BVI) Ltd [2002] 2 HKLRD 290 and from Re 
Luen Cheong Tai International Holdings Ltd [2003] 2 HKLRD 719. 
43 Re Legend International Resorts Ltd [2006] HKCU 357 at 33 
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Evidently without such legislation the court is unable provide remedies to aggrieved creditors if 
the directors had exploited the interests of the creditors but falls short of breaching section 275 of 
CO for fraudulent trading.  
 
CURRENT PROPOSALS ON DIRECTORS’ LIABILITY FOR INSOLVENT TRADING 
In October 2009, a Consultation Paper was released to seek public input on the proposed 
statutory obligations due to be tabled to the Legislative Council by the end of 2010 for 
consideration. Earlier the FSTB with the Official Receiver’s Office was instructed by the Hong 
Kong government to review the submissions and identify key objections of the stakeholders on 
the Bills in 2000 and 2001.44 The new proposed legislation was based on the 2001 CCR Bill.  
 
Using the Global Economic Crisis as a pretext, the government is reintroducing legislation to 
formalise and regulate corporate rescue procedure. The Consultation Paper stated the proposed 
legislation is relevant to the recent global financial crisis as,  
The procedure [Corporate Rescue Procedures] would be particularly helpful in reducing the stress to the 
economy when a greater number of companies with viable business for the longer term face more 
immediate and short term financial difficulty in a cyclical economic downturn. It would be beneficial to the 
company’s shareholders and creditors who might in due course get a better return from the success of the 
rescue plan than from the outcome of a winding up. It would also be beneficial to the company’s employees 
as well as suppliers and contractors for that portion of employment and purchases that might be retained by 
the rescue.45  
                                                 
44 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 8. 
45 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 9. 
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As part of this legislative package, directors ought to be compelled to act earlier rather than later 
so as to avoid corporate insolvency. The diagram below (figure 2) illustrates the policy 
objectives set out in the legislative proposal. Directors’ duty to avoid insolvency is one of 6 key 
issues that will be regulated. 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
In the Consultation Paper the government reiterated the substance of the 2001 Bill by noting the 
following, 
The insolvent trading provisions were intended to be applicable to companies in general and not only in the 
context of provisional supervision. However, these provisions would in effect serve as an incentive to 
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induce responsible persons to initiate provisional supervision earlier, rather than resorting to insolvent 
trading before liquidation.46  
 
More importantly, the Consultation Paper made some amendments to the wordings of the 
proposed legislation because:  
During scrutiny of the 2001 Bill, some stakeholders from the business sector expressed concerns that the 
insolvent trading provision would discourage directors and senior management from taking any risk and 
would not be conducive to business operations. Having reviewed this issue, and having made reference to 
the regimes in other jurisdictions, we remain of the view that some form of insolvent trading provision is 
needed to complement provisional supervision by encouraging directors to act on insolvency earlier rather 
than later to prevent further erosion of the distressed company’s assets at the detriment of creditors.47 
 
To address the business sector’s concerns, Consultation Paper made two adjustments to the 
insolvent trading provision first is to exclude senior management from being liable under 
insolvent trading, and second to modify the standard in establishing liability.  
 
On the first amendment the FSTB stated in Consultation Paper that:  
Notwithstanding the LRC’s recommendation in this regard, we consider that there will unavoidably be 
questions as to who is a “senior manager”. We have also made reference to the insolvent or wrongful 
trading provisions in other major common law jurisdictions, such as Australia and the UK, and note that the 
relevant provisions in those jurisdictions do not cover senior managers. We therefore consider it 
appropriate to retain liability for directors (including shadow directors), while exempting senior 
management from being liable for insolvent trading.48  
On the second matter, it stated that:  
                                                 
46 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 33. 
47 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 33-34. 
48 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 34. 
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Among the grounds to establish liability for insolvent trading… we propose dropping ground (1)(b) 
[section 295C] to impose a higher standard in establishing liability so as to address the business sector’s 
concerns. As a result, responsible persons will only be held liable if they knew or ought reasonably to have 
known the company was insolvent or knew or ought reasonably to have known that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company could avoid becoming insolvent. A reasonable suspicion of the 
company’s insolvency will not suffice.49 
 
On the 9th of July 2010, the Hong Kong government released the Consultation Conclusion which 
took into account some 59 submissions about the proposals in the October 2009 Consultation 
Paper.50  The Consultation Conclusion Paper found that,  
[a]n overwhelming majority of responses supported the introduction of insolvent trading provisions, 
including many of those from the business sector and practitioners. Some submissions noted that the 
introduction of insolvent trading provisions would encourage directors to act on insolvency earlier and 
would enhance corporate governance. One submission suggested that it should be made clear that a 
company trading while undergoing corporate rescue should not result in insolvent trading liability for its 
directors and provisional supervisor.51 
In addition, the conclusion paper also uncovered that, 
Among the minority dissenting submissions, which were from the business sector and practitioners, there 
were concerns that insolvent trading provisions would deter directors from taking risk and that it might be 
too easy for companies to be caught by insolvent trading provisions.52 
 
                                                 
49 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 34. 
50 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 1. 
51 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 24. 
52 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 24. 
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The public submissions were categorised into three areas. Firstly, there was overwhelming 
majority of public support for the two proposed amendments. But the Conclusions Paper noted 
that,  
A few submissions, who were from the business sector and practitioners, suggested that a defence should 
be provided for directors who had acted reasonably and honestly.53  
Secondly, those who did not support the proposed formulation expressed concerns that dropping 
the ground “reasonable grounds for suspecting” in establishing liability would make the 
insolvent trading provisions too weak and would undermine the effectiveness of the provisions.54 
This notation was from our submission in dated the 30th December 2009. We made the following 
argument:  
Without reasonable suspicion, if the director knew or expect insolvency is to happen in due course, it would 
seem too late for the director to act in ‘prevention’.  Without this heightened alert, we contend that it is 
unfair to ask directors to act in such a short time frame (almost too late) and hold them personally liable. By 
acting earlier- that is, as soon as any suspicion occurs, it gives directors some sort of guidelines to act as 
soon as possible. We hold the view that the sooner they act, the more they can resolve in the light of 
corporate rescue. Upon suspicion, one would require positive action of prevention of insolvent trading from 
happening at an earlier stage. When insolvency actually happens then it is too late. Often the time is of 
essence when determining insolvency and when a range of events unfold. Therefore, it is necessary for 
‘suspecting insolvency’ to work hand in hand with prevention.55 
 
We took the definition of “suspect” from the Australian case, Queensland Bacon v Rees Pty Ltd 
(1966) 115 CLR 266, Kitto J held that suspect was ‘more than a mere idle wondering whether 
                                                 
53 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 25. 
54 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 25. 
55 Young A and Chu T, Submission to the Financial Services and Treasury Bureau in response to ‘Review of 
Corporate Rescue Procedure Legislative Proposal: Consultant Paper’ (2009), 
http://www.fstb.gov.hk/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/review_crplp/Angus%20Young%20&%20Tina%20Chu.pdf ,viewed 12 
July 2010. 
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[insolvency] exists or not, it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust, amounting 
to a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence.’56. Also in Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd 
v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699, Einfeld J held that reasonable grounds to suspect,  
must be judged by the standard appropriate to a director of ordinary competence.’57   
Using these definitions as a basis, the draft subsection would only require that any prudent 
director must investigate further into the likelihood of insolvency, if he or she believed that there 
were sufficient grounds to do so. This should be a matter of course for good business risk 
management practices and should not discourage directors from taking calculated business risks, 
and in our opinion is an unfounded justification by the business community searching for any 
reason to reject increased director responsibility. 
 
On the third issue, the Conclusion Paper stated that,  
One of the proposed constituent elements of insolvent trading was “failure to take any steps to prevent 
insolvent trading”. There were suggestions that the word “any” in proposed section 295C(1)(c) of the 
consequential amendments to the Companies Ordinance in the 2001 Bill should be replaced by the word 
“all”.58 
 
The Hong Kong government’s responses to the above are to:  
1. exclude senior management from liability under insolvent trading;  
                                                 
56 Queensland Bacon v Rees Pty Ltd (1966) 115 CLR 266. 
57Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699 at 703. 
58 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 25. 
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2. modify the standard in establishing liability by dropping “reasonable grounds for 
suspecting”, and; 
3. rephrases the text from “failed to take any steps to prevent insolvent trading” to “failed to 
prevent insolvent trading”.59  
 
In spite of the compromises the Hong Kong government have to accept, after ten years in 
waiting, with the majority submissions positive about the amended provisions to the previous 
proposals contained in the CO (Amendments) Bill 2000 and the CCR Bill 2001, the government 
is planning to submit a Bill to the Legislative Council in the current seating by the end of this 
year. 
 
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 
As noted earlier Hong Kong’s economy is dominated by Chinese family-owned and controlled 
companies. Unlike large companies where Anglo-American governance practices and 
management methods are adopted, many of these Chinese family-owned and controlled 
companies, usually small to medium sized are governed principally by traditional Chinese values 
and beliefs. These cultural values and beliefs are deeply rooted in the teachings of Confucius,60 
and they practice paternalistic governance, reminiscent of the hierarchic pattern of control based 
on the family patriarchy.61  
 
                                                 
59 Financial Services and Treasury Bureau, n15, at 26. 
60 Tomasic R and Little P Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia (Pearson, Hong Kong, 1997) 3 
61 Redding, n6, pp. 43, 156-68. 
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The head of these companies see themselves as “big boss” (lau pan) and their decisions do not 
need any explanation, or be subjected to any scrutiny by other members of the board.62 If father 
or mother is the CEO/Chair of the company, the children who might be members of the board of 
directors are answerable and subservient to the family patriarch and not the company. This 
practice originates from the Confucian doctrine of filial piety (xiao) where children must be 
above all else, be obedient to their parents.63 If there are relatives on the board, the head of the 
company is usually the most senior member of the extended family. Members of the board are 
expected to have questionable loyalty (zhong) to the chair/CEO and not the organisation.64 But 
how does will this impact on insolvent trading provisions? 
 
First, the key decision-maker is the CEO/Chair and not the board, so the family patriarchy will 
take it upon himself or herself not to let the company go under. This could mean allowing the 
company to continue to trade whilst being insolvent. The empirical research suggest that there is 
still a little stigma attached to corporate insolvency and personal bankruptcy because this would 
mean a “loss of face” for the family.65 Since the Chinese business culture puts a lot of emphasis 
on personal reputation and trust, if the family business goes into liquidation, the loss of trust 
(xing) and face (mianzi) will negatively affect members of the family future business endeavours. 
This is because the tainted reputation from corporate failure would affect the business 
community willingness to deal or associate with them.66 
                                                 
62 Mead, R. International Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (3rd ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 2005) pp. 278-9. 
63 Redding, n6, p.59. 
64  Chen M Inside Chinese Business: A Guide for Managers Worldwide (Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
2001) 27-30 
65 Tomasic R and Little P, n60, p 124 
66 Tomasic R and Little P, n60, pp 124-6 
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Second, in Hong Kong's business dealings amongst close knitted family-owned companies are 
common, personal relationships tend to prevail over legal rules because they have been doing 
business for many years, some even for generations. These companies often shy away from the 
law. In part due to the Confucian tradition avoiding confrontation or the use of the law to settle 
disputes. Negotiations and compromises are instead preferred. This suggests laws are noting 
more than "paper tigers" – empty symbolism.67 Kamarul and Tomasic observed that: 
[i]n Hong Kong, insolvency law is used mainly by foreign creditors and corporations, and rarely by 
Chinese businesses ... Chinese businesses, however, use the legislation as it is perceived to be based on 
foreign laws, rather than on Chinese social tradition ... According to one major international accounting 
firm, in Hong Kong, 'there has been little purely Chinese insolvency. We are involved with foreign 
investors who come un stuck. Chinese families stick together generally, except where they want to make an 
example of someone or recognise the situation is beyond their collective means.' An expatriate accountant 
said, of the solvency law, that 'we have an English system imposed on Hong Kong, which does not 
necessarily reflect how Hong Kong works. The Chinese system is one of self-reliance, where people aim to 
solve their problems themselves you keep it within the family’.68 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the LRC report to a legislative proposal with a fighting chance to pass the Legislative 
Council, the Hong Kong had to wait more than ten years to achieve this policy objective. 
Whether is it the question of timing – post GFC climate, or the patience and determination of the 
government to get this Bill through to become law? Yet this question is not that important, what 
is significant or momentous is that after ten years in waiting two failed attempts, it is finally 
                                                 
67 Lau A, Nowland J and Young A, “In Search of Good Governance for Family Listed Companies: A Case Study on 
Hong Kong” (2007) 28 Company Lawyer 306 at 309 
68 B. Kamarul and R. Tomasic, "The Rule of Law and Corporate Insolvency in Six Asian Legal Systems", 
in Kanishka Jayasuriya (eds.) Law, Capitalism and Power in Asia (Routledge, London, 1999) p 151 at 167 
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going to get this Bill passed at the end of this year. However the comprises the government had 
to take on board made the proposed provision less stringent. The standard of care for directors 
had been lowered from “reasonable grounds for suspecting” in establishing liability to the 
present - directors are liable if they knew or ought reasonably to have known the company was 
insolvent or knew or ought reasonably to have known that there was no reasonable prospect that 
the company could avoid becoming insolvent. This was obviously a political choice not a legal 
one, but this does not diminish the need for higher standards for directors’ positive duties, 
requiring them to act at the first sign of financial distress.  
 
We came to the conclusion that this is a sub optimal choice. When compared to the Australian 
statutory obligations section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the proposed standard of 
liability for directors is much lower. Therefore, the incentive for directors in Hong Kong to avoid 
trading insolvency is not sufficient for the objectives in the proposed provision to be realised. We 
hold this view in spite the fact that Australia is currently rethinking its strict approach by 
proposing a safe harbour alternative, moratorium or preserving the status quo.69 
 
On another level, there is also cultural factor in Hong Kong. Whilst we think that insolvency law 
reform is a positive and necessary step for Hong Kong government and the business community 
to take, its impact and effectiveness would vary according to cultural orientation and values held 
by the executives and owners. For Chinese family-owned and controlled, usually small to mid 
sized companies, transplanting Western laws to regulate these types of companies might not be 
                                                 
69 Federal Treasury, “Insolvent Trading: A Safe Harbour for reorganisation attempts outside of external 
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<http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2010/004.htm&pageID=003&min=ceba&Ye
ar=&DocType= >  
26 
 
appropriate.70 Nevertheless, this does not negate from the fact that the enactment of corporate 
rescue procedures in Hong Kong by the end of this year is a momentous achievement for the 
Hong Kong government. 
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